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HEW'S POWER TO GRANT AFDC BENEFITS
TO TECHNICALLY INELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS
I. INTRODUCTION
Aid to Families with Dependent Children1 (AFDC), one of the
three categorical public assistance programs established by the
Social Security Act of 1935,2 is administered by the states and
financed substantially by the federal government on a matching
fund basis.3 Although states are not required to participate in
the program, those that wish to do so must submit an AFDC
plan for the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW).4 The plan must comply with requirements of
the Act and with rules and regulations promulgated by HEW.5
If, after a plan has been approved, HEW finds a lack of substan-
tial compliance with federal requirements in the administration
of the plan, federal funding may be partially or completely
terminated.6
It is a well-settled principle that HEW may not accept a state
plan that excludes from coverage persons who are eligible for
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-60 (Supp. IV, 1974).
2 The program originally was called Aid to Dependent Children (ADC). Act of
Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 627-29. The name of the ADC program was
changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962. Act of July 25,
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(3), 76 Stat. 185. The other two original categorical
programs were Old-Age Assistance, Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, §§ 1-6, 49 Stat.
620-22, and Aid to the Blind, Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, §§ 1001-06, 49 Stat.
645-47. A fourth categorical program was established in 1950, Aid to the Permanently
and Totally Disabled, Act of Aug. 28, 1950, ch. 809, § 351, 64 Stat. 555-58. The three
categorical programs other than AFDC were repealed effective January 1, 1974 with
respect to all areas except Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, Act of Oct. 30,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 301-03, 86 Stat. 1465-84 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83c
(Supp. IV, 1974)). Persons formerly eligible under the repealed programs may now
receive aid under the Supplemental Security Income program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83c
(Supp. IV, 1974), which is financed solely by the federal government. See Hannington
v. Weinberger, 393 F. Supp. 553, 560 (D.D.C. 1975).
3 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 603 (Supp. 1976).
4 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1970).
5 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (Supp. 1976); 45 C.F.R.
§§ 201-80 (1975).
6 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2) (1970).
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AFDC under federal standards unless the exclusion is permitted
by the Act itself.7 Recently, HEW has claimed the authority to
extend federal funds on an optional basis to states whose AFDC
plans provide for temporary coverage in certain circumstances
of persons not technically eligible under section 4068 of the Act.
Despite the general principle of mandatory coverage of all eligi-
ble individuals, HEW has permitted states to exclude from
coverage persons qualifying for federal assistance under HEW's
temporary aid standards.
The agency first claimed this authority in litigation concern-
ing AFDC for unborn children, culminating in the Supreme
Court decision, Burns v. Alcala.9 Relying on its prior determina-
tion that unborn children were technically eligible for assistance,
HEW had been offering AFDC payments on behalf of the un-
born at the option of the states since 1941. During the course of
litigation, however, in which plaintiffs demanded mandatory
AFDC benefits for the unborn, HEW suddenly denied that un-
born children were technically eligible under the Act, asserted
authority to aid the technically ineligible, and interpreted its
aid-to-the-unborn regulation as an exercise of that authority.1
The Court in Alcala, holding that unborn children were not
technically eligible for AFDC, accepted HEW's interpretation of
its temporary aid regulation, but refrained from passing on
its validity.
HEW based its authority to provide temporary aid to techni-
cally ineligible individuals on section 1102," the grant of general
rulemaking power under the Act. Section 1102 provides in part:
"[T]he Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare . . . shall
make and publish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent
with this chapter as may be necessary to the efficient administra-
tion of the functions with which [he] is charged under this
chapter."'12 According to HEW, section 1102 authorizes the
agency to offer temporary aid to "individuals who within a brief
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Town-
send v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); text accom-
panying notes 68-69 infra. Eligibility for AFDC benefits is determined under § 406 of
the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 606 (Supp. IV, 1974).
8 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 606 (Supp. IV, 1974). See Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
9 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
10 For a discussion of the origin of HEW's claim of authority to aid technically
ineligible persons, see text accompanying notes 108-27 infra.
1142 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
12Id.
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period will meet the statutory criteria for a 'dependent child,' ",3
when such payments "are consistent with and assist in achieving
the purposes of the AFDC program, and . .. promote the effi-
cient administration of that program.""
HEW's definition of its power in general terms suggests its
applicability beyond the unborn child situation. In fact, HEW
has indicated that the temporary aid theory is also the basis for
its regulations permitting optional AFDC payments to: (1) a
specified relative15 on behalf of a child for a period of thirty days
before the child arrives to live with the relative,'" (2) a specified
relative for a period of one month on behalf of a dependent
child who had lived with the relative for only part of that
month, 7 and (3) a nonrelative on behalf of a needy child who is
living in the home of the nonrelative because of an emergency.' 8
13 Section 406 of the Act defines a "dependent child" as
a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason
of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental in-
capacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather,
grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister,
uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained
by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A)
under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as deter-
mined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) a
student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly attend-
ing a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for gainful
employment ....
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). The standard of need is determined by the states. 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(7) (1970). E.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318 n.14 (1968).
14 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575
(1975). In its brief in Alcala HEW characterized those on whose behalf the temporary
aid is provided as including only individuals soon to become eligible for assistance. Id.
13-14. The temporary aid regulation that authorizes benefits for an entire month on
behalf of a child who has left the home during the month, however, indicates that tem-
porary aid may also be available to defray residual expenses of a child who hasjust lost
eligibility. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(iii) (1975). Such a regulation fulfills HEW's criteria
for eligibility for temporary aid. Text accompanying notes 61-62 infra.
15 A "specified relative ' is a relative of a child listed in § 406 of the Act. Note 13
supra.
16 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(i) (1975).
17 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(iii) (1975). It might be suggested that HEW derives its
authority to promulgate this regulation and 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(i) (1975), from
§ 406(e)(1) of the Act. That section provides for emergency assistance, at the option
of the states, on behalf of a needy child during a thirty-day period in which the child
is or has been in the home of a specified relative. 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1970). HEW
has referred to these two temporary aid regulations, however, as examples of regula-
tions issued under its general grant of rulemaking power. Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 14 & n.5, Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975). The Supreme
Court also has interpreted the regulations to be based on HEW's general grant of rule-
making power. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1975).
18 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(iv) (1975).
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In each circumstance, AFDC aid is offered even though it is
purportedly not authorized by the technical eligibility provisions
of the Act.
Because the initial determination by HEW of whether a class
of persons is or is not technically eligible under section 406 may
be given great weight by the courts,' 9 the question arises whether
HEW's utilization of its new approach after interpreting section
406 in close cases to deny coverage might displace the principle
of mandatory coverage of all eligible individuals .21 Aside from
the issue of the propriety of HEW's exercise of its rulemaking
power, the question whether HEW's temporary aid regulations
are truly within the agency's rulemaking power has not been
finally determined.
After considering HEW's asserted power to authorize tem-
porary aid on behalf of ineligible persons and the impact of this
power on the principle of mandatory coverage of all eligible
individuals, this Comment concludes that HEW has the power
to aid the technically ineligible in narrowly defined circum-
stances. HEW's extension of federal funds on an optional basis
under the temporary aid approach, however, circumvents the
federal policy of mandatory coverage. Thus, when a reviewing
court agrees with HEW that aid to a class of needy persons
would further the purposes of the Act, the court should favor
technical eligibility over temporary aid. Alternatively, the court
should make temporary aid mandatory.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF HEW's CLAIMED
POWER AND THE DEGREE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Section 1102 of the Social Security Act,2' on which HEW's
temporary aid regulations purportedly are based, is the general
grant of rulemaking power in the Social Security Act. Section
1102 circumscribes both the force-the deference accorded by
reviewing courts-and the scope of regulations promulgated by
HEW in the absence of a more specific grant of power.22
19 Text accompanying notes 25-33 infra.
2' Text accompanying notes 105-27 infra.
21 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). Text accompanying note 12 supra.
22 In addition to granting a general rulemaking power, Congress may specifically
authorize the agency to prescribe standards in particular contexts. E.g., 42 U.S.C.
§§ 602(a)(8)(A)(i) & (B)(i) (1970). The scope of specific enabling provisions should be in-
terpreted in accordance with the congressional purpose giving rise to their enactment.
See Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 913 (1970). If
the language or legislative history of a specific delegation of rulemaking power indi-
cates that regulations promulgated thereunder may be broader in scope than the gen-
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A. Degree of Judicial Deference
Generally, administrative regulations may be characterized
as either "legislative" or "interpretative. ' 23 The distinction is im-
portant primarily in regard to the force of a particular regula-
tion. HEW's regulations promulgated pursuant to section 1102
are interpretative.2 4 Although a court may invalidate a legislative
rule if the rule is unreasonable, is not within the granted power,
or is issued by deficient procedure, the court may not substitute
its own judgment for the substance of the rule because the legis-
lature has determined that only the agency shall have the power
to make the judgment in question: Legislative rules have the
force of law. 25 Interpretative rules on the other hand, while
often accorded great weight, are not controlling. They may be
replaced by a court's own view of the proper policy even though
the interpretative rule is not ultra vires.26 The degree of defer-
ence a reviewing court will accord an interpretative regulation
depends on a number of factors: whether the regulation is one
of longstanding interpretation; 27 whether the .statute has been
reenacted by a legislative body aware of the rule; 28 whether the
subject matter is within the agency's special expertise;29 whether
the administrative judgment is well-reasoned; 31 and whether the
eral rulemaking grant would allow, such regulations would be valid because that is
Congress' intent. A regulation that exceeds a specific grant of rulemaking power,
however, should still be valid if it is a proper exercise of the general rillemaking power.
23 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958); see, e.g., Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-37 (1974); American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 316 F.2d 419, 422 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 44 F. Supp. 603, 607 (E.D. Wash. 1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943), aff'd,
321 U.S. 583 (1944).
24 Matczak v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 299 F. Supp. 409, 412 n.4
(E.D.N.Y. 1969). Although it rarely utilizes the "interpretative-legislative" terminology,
the Supreme Court, rather than deem them binding if valid, accords HEW regulations
"substantial weight" if it agrees with them. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598,
602 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971). This treatment: suggests
that the regulations are "interpretative" as defined in text accompanying notes 26-32
infra.
25 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 23, § 5.05, at 314-15; see American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936) (legislative rule); Matczak v. Secretary of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, 299 F. Supp. 409, 412 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
21 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 23, § 5.05, at 315; see Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750,
756 (2d Cir. 1974); Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973).27 See, e.g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 585 (1975); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382 (1969); Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481,
499 (1958).
2
1See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965).
25 See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 309-10
(1953).
30 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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administrative regulation conflicts with the enabling statute.31
When an interpretative regulation fares well by these standards,
the courts will normally defer to the regulation, ascribing to it
the force of law.
3 2
Because HEW's regulations are interpretative, then, even if
as a matter of power HEW's temporary aid approach is au-
thorized by section 1102, regulations promulgated thereunder
are not binding on the courts. Neither, of course, is the correla-
tive finding of a lack of technical eligibility. As will be elaborated
below, 33 the power of a court to substitute its judgment for an
HEW regulation which it deems unwise or undesirable stands as
a potentially meaningful check on HEW's resort to the tempor-
ary aid approach when that approach would not best serve the
purposes of the Social Security Act.
B. Permissible Scope of HEW Regulations
Although the legislative-interpretative distinction is a critical
one concerning the issue of the force of an administrative regu-
lation, it is less useful in determining the legitimacy of the scope
of a regulation under section 1102. In fact, the terminology is
misleading in the latter case to the extent it suggests that legisla-
tive rules do not interpret, and that interpretative rules may only
interpret specific statutory terms in the sense of identifying the
legislature's actual intent. If otherwise valid, regulations which
are legislative because binding on the courts may, and occasion-
ally do, interpret statutory language. 4 As will be shown, rules
which are interpretative because they are persuasive only, and
not controlling on a court, may flesh out a statute where no ac-
tual legislative intent, or even language, exists.3 5 Were HEW
confined to finding actual congressional intent with regard to
specific terms in the Social Security Act, the agency's promulga-
tion of its temporary aid regulations necessarily would be an
unlawful exercise of power: The regulations are premised'on the
absence of a specific conferral of eligibility by the terms of the
Act. HEW's representation of its rulemaking power under sec-
tion 1102, however, is correct.
"' See, e.g., Matczak v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 299 F. Supp. 409, 412
n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
3'2 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-82 (1969).
" Text accompanying notes 147-51 infra.
" E.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944) (regulation
interpreting "area of production" in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-19 (1970)).
" Notes 42-55 infra & accompanying text.
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It is commonly held that regulations issued under the broad
rulemaking authority granted to HEW by section 1102 are valid
if reasonably related to the purposes of, and not contrary to, the
language of the Act.36 This standard appears to confer on HEW
great discretion to extend by regulations the literal reach of the
Act. Courts frequently declare, however, that the power of an
administrative agency to administer a federal statute is not the
power to make law, but the power to prescribe rules and regula-
tions to effectuate the will of Congress as expressed by statute,
3 7
and that the authority to extend or modify a law is not implied in
the grant of authority to enforce it.38 While this principle limits
HEW's discretion to some extent, actual decisions reveal that
HEW has substantial latitude in administering the Social Security
Act.3 9
Regulations that are clearly authorized by HEW's general
rulemaking power are those prescribing internal procedures"
and those defining specific terms of the Act.4 1 In the promulga-
tion of the first kind of regulation little danger exists that HEW
will extend or modify the substantive features of the Act. The
formulation of definitional regulations, on the other hand, often
involves creative lawmaking. To be sure, some definitional regu-
lations may appear interpretative in the strictest sense because
their content is strongly suggested by explicit indications of con-
36 Johnson's Professional Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841, 844 (5th Cir.
1974); Rochester v. Baganz, 479 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 1973), on remand, 365 F. Supp.
179 (D. Del. 1973), rev'd, 503 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1974); Serritella v. Engelman, 462 F.2d
601, 602-03 (3d Cir. 1972); see, e.g., Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 558-59 (1970);
Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 919 (1972); Connecticut State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 448 F.2d 209
(2d Cir. 1971); cf. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969).
"7 E.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965); Gardner v. Ewing, 88 F.
Supp. 315, 322 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 185 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1950), revd in part on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 321 (1951); see Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 926 (1975); cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
38 Gardner v. Ewing, 88 F. Supp. 315, 322 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 185 F.2d 781 (6th Cir.
1950), revd in part on other grounds, 341 U.S. 321 (1951) (invalidating a regulation hav-
ing a harsh effect on potential recipients of old-age benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970)).
39 Cases cited note 47 infra.
40 Such rules ordinarily are regarded as legislative even without a specific grant of
power to issue the rules. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265
(1954) (procedure for processing an alien's application for suspension of deportation); 1
K. DAVIS, supra note 23, § 5.03, at 299-300.
41 Of course, in some instances the content of a definitional regulation may be
disapproved by a reviewing court, but the formulation of this type of regulation is
within the power of HEW. Text accompanying notes 44-51 infra.
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gressional intent. But regulations defining ambiguous statutory
provisions or supplying terms not present in the statute, in the
absence of clear, or any, legislative history, can hardly be said to
"interpret" anything at all.42 Such regulations add to what Con-
gress specifically intended to put into the particular statute.
43
An illustration of creative rulemaking is found in Lewis v.
Martin,44 a decision frequently cited for its recognition of the
breadth of HEW's rulemaking power.45 In Lewis, the Supreme
Court examined an HEW regulation 46 providing that, in the
determination of financial eligibility for AFDC and the benefit
amount, only the income of a "parent" may be considered avail-
able for dependent children in the absence of proof of actual
contributions. The regulation defined "parent," within the
meaning of section 406(a) of the Social Security Act,47 as the
child's natural or adoptive parent or a stepparent who is cere-
monially married to the child's natural or adoptive parent and is
subject to a legal obligation of support under a state law of gen-
eral applicability.48 Thus a man in the house, if not the child's
natural or adoptive parent, and if not ceremonially married to
such a parent, was not deemed a "parent" by the regulation
even if legally obligated to support. "Parent" had been inter-
preted by the Court in a prior decision, 49 after a survey of the
relevant legislative history, as simply including those persons
with a legal duty of support. Nevertheless, the Court in Lewis
held the HEW regulation valid, observing that HEW might rea-
sonably conclude that the stricter requirement was necessary
"as a matter of current, practical realities" to serve the Act's
basic purpose of aiding needy children who are without the sup-
port of a "breadwinner." 50 Thus the regulation, though clearly
reaching past specific congressional intent, was sustained as a
valid exercise of HEW's rulemaking power. 51
42 1 K. DAvIs, supra note 23, § 5.03, at 304-05.
43 1d.; see Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 339 (1941).
44 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
4' See, e.g., Rochester v. Baganz, 479 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 1973); Arizona State
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456, 467 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
919 (1972); Almenares v. Wyman, 334 F. Supp. 512, 521 (S.D.N.Y.), modifed, 453 F.2d
1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972).
4645 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1971).
4'42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
48 45 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1971).
'9 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327 (1968). King is discussed in text accompanying
notes 68-82 infra.
50 397 U.S. at 558-59.
'I See also Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 602 (1972) (defining "continued
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Administrative regulations setting forth procedural mea-
sures (beyond those affecting internal agency operations) that
facilitate the administration of a statute and the attainment of its
goals may be upheld even though not required affirmatively by
the statute. The Court, in sustaining such a regulation in Thorpe
v. Housing Authority,52 established the standard of "reasonably
related to the purposes of the statute" for regulations promul-
gated under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of
1937, 53 a grant of rulemaking power comparable to section 1102
of the Social Security Act. 54 In Thorpe the Court approved a rule
issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
requiring housing authorities to explain why they were evicting a
tenant who was apparently in the class of people benefited by
the Act. The Court deemed the procedure reasonably related to
the Act's purpose of providing a decent home to every American
family that lacks the financial means to provide one for itself.55
The principle of administrative discretion illustrated by
Lewis and Thorpe properly applies to HEW's temporary aid regu-
lations. Although neither the Social Security Act nor its legisla-
tive history affirmatively indicates a congressional intent that
these regulations be established, Lewis and Thorpe suggest that no
such intent is required. Surely, were specific legislative intent
essential to the validity of every administrative regulation, the
administration of the parent statute would be hampered im-
absence" in the AFDC statute); Johnson's Professional Nursing Home v. Weinberger,
490 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1974) (defining "reasonable charges" in Medicaid statute);
Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2 456 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 919 (1972) (defining "residence" for the OAA, AFDC, AB, and APTD pro-
grams in the Social Security Act. In Rigby v. Rasmussen, 275 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1960),
the court upheld as within the statutory framework of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1970), a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture which supplied a sixth factor to supplement the five expressly provided by
the statute for formulating base acreage. The regulation was deemed necessary to im-
plement properly the congressional purposes. Rigby v. Rasmussen, 275 F.2d 861, 863
(10th Cir. 1960).
52 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1408 (1970).
See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 277 n.28, 280-81 (1969).
55 393 U.S. at 281. See also Rochester v. Baganz, 479 F.2d 603 (3d Cir. 1973); Ser-
ritella v. Engelman, 462 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1972); Nelson v. Sugarman, 361 F. Supp.
1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Almenares v. Wyman, 334 F. Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 453
F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972). In Almenares, the district
court sustained as consistent with the objectives of the AFDC program, an HEW regula-
tion requiring participating states to conduct a hearing prior to taking adverse action.
The court noted that where a statute does not indicate affirmatively an intent to estab-
lish such a regulation, the regulation may be authorized by a sufficiently broad grant of
authority such as that in § 1102. 334 F. Supp. at 521.
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measurably. It is therefore not fatal to the validity of the tem-
porary aid regulations that they are not based on specific terms
in the Act purportedly suggesting their creation.
When inclusion of certain classes of needy persons in the
AFDC program is clearly consistent with the purposes of the
Act, HEW has defined, under its general rulemaking power,
the eligibility provisions of the Act to allow inclusion even in
the absence of supportive legislative history.56 In circumstances
where HEW regards a group of persons as falling outside the
eligibility provisions of the Act, those persons would seem not
to be entitled to the benefits of the Act. Superficially, HEW's
temporary aid regulations appear to contravene this corollary by
authorizing benefits to persons who, by the agency's own deter-
mination, are technically ineligible for assistance. But this treat-
ment of the disputed regulations misses their true import. The
regulations, according to HEW, are designed to promote the
efficient administration of the Act by facilitating the assistance of
those who are technically eligible. Persons receiving AFDC aid
on behalf of a child under the temporary aid regulations during
a brief period in which the child is technically ineligibile are
benefited only incidentally for the purpose of insuring the
proper care of a dependent child when the child actually fulfills
the technical eligibility requirements.
For example, the first of the four temporary aid regulations
authorizes payments to a specified relative for a period of thirty
days before the dependent child arrives to live with the
relative.5 7 Payments are extended not to benefit the relative in
his own right, but to allow the recipient to purchase necessary
furnishings and food for purposes of caring for the child when
the child does arrive. 58 Instead of delaying payments until the
child establishes technical eligibility by arriving at the relative's
home, HEW recognizes the practical desirability of permitting
the relative to prepare for the child's needs shortly before those
needs are felt. Similarly, AFDC assistance extended under the
unborn child regulation5 9 enables the mother to provide for the
immediate care of her child upon birth and, additionally, pro-
56 See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970);-text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
57 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (c)(2)(i) (1975).
8 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Wilson v. Weaver, 499
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated sub nom. Trainor v. Weaver, 420 U.S. 999 (1975),
quoted in Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 876 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974) (Ainsworth, J., dissent-
ing), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 926 (1975).
59 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1975). The regulation, as an optional measure based
on HEW's § 1102 rulemaking power, is still in effect.
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motes the child's health, which is closely dependent on the condi-
tion of the mother during pregnancy."
The third regulation, in authorizing payments for an entire
month during the course of which the child leaves the relative's
61 terhome, permits the relative to defray expenses incurred on the
child's behalf while he was in the home and thus technically
eligible for aid, and recognizes the administrative inefficiency of
adjusting the AFDC award to cover a period of less than one
month.6 2 The propriety of the fourth regulation, which provides.
assistance to a nonrelative while the child is in the nonrelative's
home because of an emergency, 3 is demonstrated best by an
example. If the mother of a dependent child is hospitalized un-
expectedly, the child must be cared for in her absence. By per-
mitting assistance to a nonrelative who assumes the care of the
child during this period, HEW recognizes that the child is only
temporarily ineligible for aid and will become technically eligible
again as soon as the mother returns to her home and the child
returns to her. Moreover, it may be more desirable for the child
to stay with a neighbor with whom the child is familiar and
comfortable than for him to stay in an institution during the
emergency. The purposes of the Act and its efficient administra-
tion are both served by assisting the nonrelative in this manner.
Thus HEW's temporary aid approach, which eschews the
sometimes artificial cutoff between periods of technical eligibility
and ineligibility, reflects an administrative judgment of what is
necessary as a matter of practical realities to assure the achieve-
ment of the AFDC program's remedial goals.64 While extending
benefits on a long-term basis to persons in their own right, who
concededly are outside the eligibility provisions of the Act, would
be an unwarranted departure from the statutory framework,
assisting persons only temporarily ineligible, in order to promote
the attainment of the purposes of the Act at the time of technical
eligibility, would not be. The fact that such regulations are not
tied to specific statutory terms, except in an indirect way,6 5 is of
6' See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Wilson v. Weaver, 499
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), quoted in Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 876 n.7 (5th Cir.
1974) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
61 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(iii) (1975).
62 Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 875 (5th Cir. 1974) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
63 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(iv) (1975).
64 Cf. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 558-59 (1970).
65 Although the regulations do not iriterpret statutory language, they are related in
an important sense to the eligibility provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970) in that they
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no consequence: 66 .The regulations are still "necessary to the ef-
ficient administration"67 of the AFDC program and are reasona-
bly related to its purposes.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE KING-
TOWNSEND-REMILLARD TRILOGY TO HEW's
ASSERTED POWER
A. The Trilogy
The general principle that a state plan may not exclude
from AFDC coverage persons who are eligible by federal stan-
dards without clear congressional intent to make coverage op-
tional is identified with the three Supreme Court cases, King v.
Smith,68 Townsend v. Swank,69 and Carleson v. Remillard." Because
these decisions, like the unborn child cases, concern state in-
terpretations of eligibility terms in section 406(a) of the Act to
exclude individuals from AFDC coverage in the absence of con-
gressional authorization for the exclusion, a study of the trilogy
is important to define further and to assess the legitimacy of
HEW's new approach of providing temporary aid to technically
ineligible persons at the option of the states.
The Court in King7 struck down Alabama's "substitute
fathe" regulation which denied AFDC benefits to children
whose mother cohabited in or outside her home with any able-
bodied man.7 2 Under section 406 of the Act, aid may be granted
on behalf of a "dependent child" only if a "parent" of the child is
mentally or physically incapacitated or is continually absent from
the home. 3 Alabama considered a man who was a "substitute
father" under its regulation to be a nonabsent "parent,"7 4 even
though the unrelated substitute father had no legal duty to sup-
port the child.75 Emphasizing that protection of dependent chil-
dren is the paramount goal of AFDC, 76 and examining the legis-
promote the proper care of dependent children at the time of their technical eligibility
status.
66 See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969).
67 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
68 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
69 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
70 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
71 392 U.S. at 309.
7 2 1d. at 311.
7 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). For text of the provision, see note 13 supra.
74 392 U.S. at 313.
7 -Id. at 315-16 & n.10.76 Id. at 325, 330.
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lative history of the Act and the manner in which "parent" is
used throughout the Act,77 the Court concluded that the term
"parent" in section 406(a) was intended by Congress to include
only those persons with a legal duty to support the child.78
Alabama's regulation, therefore, was invalid because it defined
"parent" inconsistently with section 406(a).79 By enforcing this
invalid regulation, Alabama breached its federal obligation
under section 402(a)(10) o~f the Act to furnish "aid to families
with dependent children ... with reasonable promptness to all
elig'ble individuals ....
Although it was not immediately clear whether the Court in
King had interpreted section 402(a)(10). as federalizing the
AFDC eligibility requirements,8 ' the Court adopted this reading
of King in Townsend.82 Townsend coiicerned an Illinois statute and
regulation that denied AFDC benefits to children eighteen
through twenty years of ag who attended a college or uni-
versity.8 3 The Court held that the state statute and regulation
conflicted with section 406(a)(2) of the Act, which defined "de-
pendent child," and therefore were invalid under the supremacy
clause.8 4 The rule of King v. Smith was stated to be: "[A]t least in
the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion
clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative
history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eli-
gible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social
Security Act and is therefore invalid under the supremacy
clause."8 5
The Court explicitly rejected HEW's regulation,8 6 known as
"Condition X," that permitted states to vary eligibility require-
ments from federal standards as long as the variation was fair
and reasonable.87 The principle that accords great weight to an
'administrative agency's interpretation of a statute under its pro-
7 Id. at 328-32.
7 Id. at 332.
79 1d. at 333.
80 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970)).
" Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated to Need: the Impact of King v.
Smith, 118 U. PA. L. Rav. 1219, 1229 (1970).
82404 U.S. 282 (1971).
83 Id. at 283-84 & nn. 1-2.84 Id. at 285.
'5 Id. at 286. (emphasis supplied).
1145 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(ii) (1972). For a discussion of Condition X, see Com-
ment, supra note 81, at 1221-25; Note, Welfare's "Condition X," 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967).
The Condition X regulation has since been amended. 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1) (1975).
87 404 U.S. at 286 & n.3.
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vince was found inapplicable insofar as HEW's regulation was
inconsistent with the requirement of section 402(a)(10) that aid
be furnished "to all eligible individuals.
88
The third case in the trilogy, Remillard,89 is notable not only
because it reaffirmed King and Townsend, but also because HEW
regulations were apparently determinative in the finding of
technical eligibility under section 406 of the Act. The con-
troversy in Remillard centered around the eligibility criterion in
section 406(a) of "continued absence" of a parent from the
home. California's definition of "continued absence" as not in-
cluding military absence was found to conflict with the federal
definition.9" Relying primarily on HEW regulations, 91 the Court
concluded that "continued absence" meant absence of the parent
for any reason.92 As in King, the Court noted that eligibility of
the disputed class of individuals was consistent with the purpose
of the Act to assure the protection of children in homes without
a "breadwinner. 93 Although HEW had approved state plans
that denied benefits to the disputed class, the Court refused to
regard coverage as optional. 94 Because there was no clear con-
gressional authorization for states to exclude military orphans
from AFDC benefits, the California policy was held invalid.
95
From these three decisions, then, a rule emerges for evaluat-
ing state AFDC programs: Once a class of individuals is deter-
mined to be technically eligible for AFDC benefits by federal
standards, a state may not exclude them from coverage, regard-
less of the reasonableness of that exclusion, without clear con-
gressional authorization evidenced by the Act itself or by its
legislative historyY6 Thus before the inquiry is made whether
8 Id. at 286 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (10) (1970)).
89 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
90Id. at 601-02.
9145 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(iii) (1975).
92 406 U.S. at 602.
93 Id. at 603.
9 41 Id. at 602.
95 Id. at 604.
96 Some question exists whether the Court's decision in New York State Dep't of
Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), qualified the trilogy rule. The issue in
Dublino was whether the Work Incentive Program of the Social Security Act preempted
the New York Work Rules, which independently required individuals to accept em-
ployment as a condition for AFDC eligibility. In holding that the Rules were not
preempted, the Court distinguished King, Townsend, and Remillard as cases in which "it
was clear that state law excluded people from AFDC benefits who the Social Security
Act expressly provided would be eligible." Id. at 421 (emphasis supplied). The Court
stressed that "[ h]ere, by contrast, the Act allows for complementary state work incen-
tive programs and procedures incident thereto-even if they become conditions for
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Congress permitted an exclusion, eligibility according to federal
standards must be established.9 7 When a class of individuals is
only arguably eligible under the Act, the absence of clear evi-
dence of congressional intent to allow exclusion at the states'
option does not itself create eligibility.98
An initial determination of technical eligibility may be
reached by several routes commonly traversed in solving prob-
lems of statutory construction, as the AFDC eligibility litigation
demonstrates. If the court decides that the statutory term or
section is clear on its face, then eligibility may readily be recog-
nized or denied.99 If the portion of the Act at issue is ambig-
uous-the usual case- then an examination may be conducted
of the common meaning of the disputed term, 10 1 the statutory
context,0'1 and the legislative history.'" The purposes of the Act
should always be kept in mind.'113 Finally, an interpretation by
HEW, if consistent with the statutory purposes, may be given
substantial weight, and in close cases may be decisive.1
0 4
continued assistance. Such programs and procedures are not necessarily invalid .... Id.
at 422 (emphasis supplied). The seemingly more lenient treatment of state eligibility re-
quirements in Dublino than in the trilogy cases has been explained as a feature of pro-
cedural eligibility conditions as opposed to definitional eligibility criteria under § 406
of the Act. Note, Aid to Families with Unborn Dependent Children: May the States Withhold
Benefits?, 73 MICH. L. REv. 561, 571-73 (1975). The Court's supposed leniency, how-
ever, must be viewed in light of its remanding the case to determine whether the state
work rules did in fact "contravene the purposes or provisions of WIN." 413 U.S. at
423. Citing the trilogy, the Court stated that "if there is a conflict of substance as to
eligibility provisions, the federal law of course must control." Id. at 423 n.29 (citations
omitted). Thus, to the extent that the test employed in Dublino differs from the trilogy
rule, the difference probably is confined to the sensitive area of work rules. See Brief
for Respondent at 14, Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975). Indeed, the Supreme Court
has cited Dublino for the principle established by the trilogy cases-all persons who meet
the federal definition of eligibility must receive AFDC benefits unless the Act allows an
option to the states. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 578 (1975).
'7 Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580 (1975).
91 Id. Contra, Note, Aid to Families with Unborn Dependent Children; May the States
Withhold Benefits?, 73 MIcH. L. Rav. 561, 570 (1975).
99See Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 54 (M.D. Fla. 1974), affid in part and
remanded, 516 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1975).
100 E.g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 579-81 (1975); Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d
750, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1974).
101E.g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 581 (1975); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
330 (1968); Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 53-54 (M.D. Fla. 1974), affd in part and
remanded, 516 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1975).
'0 2 E.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 328-32 (1968); Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d
750, 754-55 (2d Cir. 1974).
103E.g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 581-82 (1975); Carleson v. Remillard, 406
U.S. 598, 603 (1972).
"" E.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 601-02 (1972); see text accompanying
notes 142-47 infra; cf. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 585 (1975). But cf. Parks v. Har-
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B. The Inconsistency of HEW's Asserted Power
with the Trilogy Principle
The interaction of the trilogy rule with HEW's asserted
power to allow payments on behalf of persons not technically
eligible is apparent. When technical eligibility under the Act is
not established initially, section 402(a)(10) is purportedly no
longer operational, and the second stage of the trilogy analysis
-whether Congress unequivocally authorized an exclusion-is
irrelevant. On this basis, HEW can claim that persons tempo-
rarily aided by HEW under its rulemaking power are not subject
to the trilogy presumption of mandatory coverage because they
are technically ineligible. 05
If HEW interprets an ambiguous eligibility provision to
deny technical eligibility to a class and promulgates a regulation
to aid these ineligibile persons, a court may accord great weight
to HEW's finding of technical ineligibility rather than make an
independent determination of the class' eligibility.'0 6 By its in-
terpretation of an ambiguous eligibility provision, then, HEW
may control whether or not the trilogy presumption of manda-
tory coverage of eligible persons will apply. HEW may seek to
use its newly asserted power as a means of restoring to the states
a measure of discretion to refrain from aiding those whom a
court might otherwise find technically eligible for assistance.
10 7
The circumstances in which HEW first claimed the authority to
aid technically ineligible persons support this view.
As noted above, 1° 8 HEW first claimed the authority to allow
the payment of AFDC benefits in certain situations to individuals
technically ineligible under the Act in the course of, and possibly
den, 354 F. Supp. 620, 623 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated
and remanded, 421 U.S. 926 (1975).
10' This Comment will argue that temporary aid to the technically ineligible should
also be subject to the mandatory coverage principle. Text accompanying notes 152-54
infra.
106 Text accompanying notes 26-32 supra; cf. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
In Lewis, the Court accorded great deference to HEW's determination that a particular
class of needy persons was eligible for assistance. Id. at 559.
107 This state discretion should not be confused with the state discretion under the
discredited "Condition X" regulation: those persons whom HEW determines are techni-
cally eligible for assistance must be included in state AFDC plans. By promulgating an
optional-aid-to-the-ineligible regulation, however, HEW, in its very declaration of a
class' ineligibility in cases in which a court might otherwise conclude that the class is
eligible or in which HEW itself believes the class is eligible, reestablishes a degree of
state discretion where none would exist under the mandatory coverage principle.
108 See text accompanying notes 9-1 1 supra.
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in response to,10 9 litigation concerning AFDC for unborn chil-
dren. HEW's policy on AFDC for the unborn had originated in
1940 in an audit exception to Wisconsin's ADC program which
extended benefits on behalf of unborn children." 0 In 1941 the
Social Security Board, HEW's predecessor,"' decided to permit
Wisconsin's payment of ADC benefits to the unborn and to allow
other states the same option of inclusion of unborn children in
their ADC programs." 2 This policy was formalized in 1946 in
HEW's Handbook of Public Assistance." 3 It is apparent from in-
teroffice letters and memoranda that the determination of the
eligibility of unborn children for ADC, incorporated in the
Handbook, originally was premised on an interpretation of the
term "dependent child" in section 406(a) of the Act to include an
unborn child."14 As least initially, then, unborn children were
deemed by HEW and its predecessor to be technically eligible
under section 406 of the Act.
In 1971 the section of the Handbook concerning unborn
children was codified in somewhat different language in the
Code of Federal Regulations." 15 Although the regulation does
not specifically make coverage optional, it has been so adminis-
tered by HEW."
6
During the litigation over AFDC for the unborn, plaintiffs
109 Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 589-90 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting ); Note,
Eligibility of the Unborn for AFDC Benefits: The Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 54 B.U. L.
REv. 945, 959 (1974).
110 Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823, 829 (E.D. Va. 1973), affid, 493 F.2d 54 (4th
Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 420 U.S. 999 (1975); Brief for Respondents at 43-44,
Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
"I HEW was established in 1953 and assumed responsibility for administering the
Social Security Act.
112 Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 588 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Memoran-
dum from Peter Kasius, Acting Director of the Bureau of Public Assistance, to Chicago
Regional Director, Aug. 23, 1941, in Addendum J, Brief for Respondents, Burns v.
Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
113 DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION § 3412.6 (Nov. 4, 1946) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. The regula-
tion first appeared in the Handbook in 1946, prior to HEW's establishment. After its
establishment in 1953, HEW administered the provisions of the Handbook.
114 Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 584 (1975); Addenda E-J, Brief for Respondent,
Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975). Moreover, the Handbook itself provided that the
eligibility of an unborn child depended upon "the same eligibility conditions as apply to
other children." HANDBOOK, supra note 113, at § 3412.6. After HEW's inception in
1953, the Handbook's provision extending aid to the unborn remained unchanged until
197 1. Burns v. Alcaa, supra at 588-89.
115 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1975); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 589 (1975)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
110 Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 579-80 n.5 (1975).
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claiming that unborn children were eligible under the Act por-
trayed the regulation as containing an implicit determination
that the unborn were "dependent children" eligible for AFDC
under section 406.117 The majority of the circuits that had ruled
on the question had held unborn children technically eligible
under the Act." 8 Several of the circuits that found unborn chil-
dren technically eligible referred to HEW's regulation as a factor
favoring technical eligibility. 19
The theory that unborn children were not technically eligi-
ble under section 406, but that the regulation permitting aid to
the unborn was authorized by section 1102, the general grant of
HEW's rulemaking power, was not advanced until well into the
litigation over AFDC for the unborn. In an early amicus brief,
HEW attempted to justify its policy of optional coverage of the
unborn on other grounds,2 " and not until its amicus brief
of May 2, 1974 in Adams v. Huecker12' did it mention section
1102.122
The Supreme Court in Burns v. Alcala,'12 3 relying in part on
the statutory context of the term, held that "dependent child" in
section 406(a) did not encompass an unborn child 2 4 and ac-
cepted HEW's contention that its regulation was based upon its
asserted authority to grant aid to ineligible persons. The Court
did not, however, pass on the legality of the regulation. 125 Thus,
HEW succeeded in characterizing its thirty-year-old practice of
providing optional aid to the unborn as an exercise of its power
1 E.g., Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421
U.S. 926 (1975).
I'l Five federal courts of appeals had held that an unborn child was a "dependent
child" within the meaning of § 406 of the Act: Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir.
1974); Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 420 U.S.
1000 (1975); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated sub nom. Trainor
v. Weaver, 420 U.S. 999 (1975); Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd,
420 U.S. 575 (1975); Doe v. Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded,
420 U.S. 999 (1975). One court of appeals had held to the contrary: Wisdom v. Norton,
507 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1974) (also declaring that HEW's unborn child regulation was not
authorized by § 1102).
"I Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 420
U.S. 1000 (1975); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1974); Alcala v. Burns,
494 F.2d 743, 745-46 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
120 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Wilson v. Weaver, 499
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), quoted in Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 876 n.7 (5th Cir.
1974) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
121 Civil No. 7815-B (W.D. Ky., May 2, 1974).
122 Brief for Respondent at 48, Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
123 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
124Id. at 581.
125Id. at 584-86.
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to offer aid to the ineligible, rather than as a determination that
unborn children were technically eligible under the Act-a de-
termination HEW and its predecessor seemingly had made as
early as 1941. HEW's interpretation of the regulations con-
tributed to the Court's holding that the unborn were ineligible
for AFDC.
126
The suddenness of HEW's shift in policy and the apparent
relationship between the shift and the litigation of the eligibility
issue suggest a potential for abuse of the temporary aid ap-
proach. By interpreting an ambiguous eligibility provision to ex-
clude a particular class of persons, even though inclusion would
further the purposes of the Act, HEW may induce a judicial
finding of technical ineligibility. The agency could then make
AFDC benefits available to the excluded class on an optional
basis through the temporary aid device.
127
The degree to which HEW may control the application of
the trilogy presumption will depend, however, on both the ex-
tent to which the technical eligibility approach and HEW's tem-
porary aid approach are interchangeable and the extent to which
courts defer to HEW's determination of technical ineligibility.
1. Interchangeability of Technical Eligibility
and the Temporary Aid Approach
The technical eligibility and the temporary aid approaches
are in fact interchangeable only in rare instances, because utiliza-
tion of the latter approach is limited to special circumstances: A
temporary aid regulation is valid only when the persons it makes
eligible temporarily do not meet the technical eligibility criteria,
and when providing these persons with funds is directly and
substantially related to their needs at the time of technical
eligibility.
12
a. Where Interchangeability Does Not Exist
The limited reach of the temporary aid approach can be
seen by applying the approach first to a case in which technical
eligibility has been held to exist and then to a situation not yet
considered by the Supreme Court in which technical eligibility
"' Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975)._
127 Mr. Justice Marshall, surveying this history of inclusion of the unborn as eligible
persons and the sudden shift in HEW's interpretation of its regulation in the face of
claims for mandatory coverage, expressed this same fear. 420 U.S. 575, 590 (1975)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).128 See text accompanying notes 56-64 supra.
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may or may not be recognized. In King,'29 the Court held that a
child whose mother cohabited with a man not legally obligated to
support the child was technically eligible as a "dependent child"
under section 406 of the Act, because a "substitute father" with-
out a legal duty of support was not a "parent" under the Act. 
13 0
HEW's promulgation of a temporary aid regulation on behalf of
a child in these circumstances plainly would have exceeded
HEW's general rulemaking power. Had the children not been
found technically eligible in King, they would not have otherwise
satisfied technical eligibility requirements within a brief period.
If the state's "substitute father" provision had been valid, the
children would have remained beyond the pale of the Act absent
an unforeseen change in circumstances. Thus unless the chil-
dren were technically eligible in their own right, an authorization
of AFDC benefits on their behalf could not have been upheld as
"necessary to the efficient administration"'13 1 of the AFDC pro-
gram. AFDC assistance to such children, if they were technically
ineligible, would have been wholly extra-statutory.
A similar analysis applies to the currently unsettled issue of
the availability of AFDC-U 132 benefits for children whose fathers
are engaged in a labor strike. Section 407(a) of the Social Se-
curity Act defines "dependent child" to include a needy child
"who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason
of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with stan-
dards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father . "... ,,33 While
section 407(a) specifically grants HEW power to define "unem-
ployment" for purposes of AFDC-U eligibility, the legislative his-
tory of section 407 reveals limitations on the scope of this specific
grant of rulemaking power. Prior to 1968, section 407 permit-
ted the states to define unemployment. 34 The resulting wide
variation in state definitions prompted Congress to amend sec-
129 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
131 Id. at 332.
131 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
132 Aid to Families with Dependent Children of Unemployed Fathers, 42 U.S.C.
§ 607 (1970). Section 607 was originally enacted in 1961 to expand the coverage of needy
children by permitting states, at their option, to broaden their definitions of "depen-
dent child" to include a child of an unemployed parent. Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-3 1, § 407, 75 Stat. 75, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970). This is an instance in
which Congress has permitted states the option of excluding eligible persons from their
AFDC plans. Text accompanying note 96 supra. Once a state decides to provide aid to
such a needy child, however, it must comply with federal standards and the policies
embodied in the trilogy cases. Accord, Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 288 (1971).
133 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970).
134 Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 607 (1970).
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tion 407.'3s Although the 1968 amendments transferred the au-
thority to prescribe standards for determining unemployment
from the states to HEW, the amended text itself specified factors
that must be included in the definition of unemployment. 36 The
power granted to HEW by the terms of section 407 was the
power to prescribe the standard for the remaining major factor,
the number of hours which a father may work before he is
considered employed. 137 The regulation initially issued by HEW
pursuant to this power was in fact limited to prescribing hours
worked. 38
Currently, the HEW regulation concerning the AFDC-U
standard for unemployment, in addition to prescribing hours
worked, provides that "at the option of the State, such definition
[of unemployment] need not include a father whose unemploy-
ment results from participation in a labor dispute . *... ,,39 Be-
cause the promulgation of this regulation exceeds the specific
power delegated to HEW by section 407(a) to prescribe stan-
dards defining unemployment, the regulation can only be up-
held if it is a legitimate exercise of HEW's general rulemaking
power under section 1102. If children of strikers are technically
eligible for AFDC-U benefits under section 407(a),' 41 1 the HEW
regulation allowing states at their option to exclude such persons
would be invalid under King, Townsend, and Remillard unless the
Act or its legislative history clearly evinces a congressional intent
to permit the exclusion. 4' HEW, however, might seek to avoid
the operation of the trilogy rule, while preserving the status quo,
by interpreting the Act to deny technical eligibility to children
whose fathers are on strike, and by asserting that section 1102
grants HEW the power to confer benefits on this class of needy
children for a temporary period on an optional basis despite the
lack of technical eligibility.
135 Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 203(a), 81 Stat. 882 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 607 (1970)). See H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 107-09 (1967); Macias
v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1256-57 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd sub nom. Macias v. Richardson,
400 U.S. 913 (1970).
' Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1970). For example, the
section now requires the father to be recently attached to the labor force. Id.137 
Id.
138 45 C.F.R. § 233.100 (1969).
139 45 C.F.R. § 23.100(a)(1)(ii) (1975).
140 Children of strikers, in fact, might be technically eligible for AFDC-U benefits
under § 407(a). See ITT Lamp Division of the IT&T Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971) (holding that a state's granting AFDC to
strikers is not precluded by § 407).
141 See text accompanying notes 68-96 supra.
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The temporary aid approach is not properly available to
HEW in this case, however. The mere fact that benefits are
authorized by the regulation for a limited period of time (the
duration of the strike) does not suffice to bring the regulation
within the class of valid temporary aid regulations. Unlike the
persons assisted by the unborn child regulation, for example, the
recipients of benefits under the strike regulation will not nor-
mally and predictably attain technical eligibility in a brief period.
AFDC-U payments extended under the strike regulation, there-
fore, would not be substantially related to the needs of a child at
the time that child is technically eligible under the Act, but
would be occasioned solely by the strike status of the child's
father, a condition hypothetically without significance in the Act.
Thus, HEW's strike regulation can be interpreted properly
only as evidencing the technical eligibility of a child whose father
is participating in a labor strike; the logic of the temporary aid
approach plainly does not extend to this regulation. If technical
AFDC-U eligibility of children with striking fathers is held to
exist, the optional feature of the HEW regulation cannot be
reconciled with the trilogy rule.
142
HEW might still insist, however, that children whose fathers
are on strike are not technically eligible, and that its regulation
authorizes only temporary aid. A reviewing court might disagree
with HEW's interpretation of its own regulation because the in-
terpretation is not as plausible on its face as was the similar
interpretation in Alcala.143 If it accepts HEW's construction,
however, the court must invalidate the regulation and then de-
termine whether technical eligibility is available. As elaborated
below,' 44 the court should not simply defer to HEW's determina-
tion of technical ineligibility, but should decide for itself whether
technical inclusion of the class is required by the Act. Should the
court find the class technically eligible, the trilogy presumption
of mandatory coverage would apply.
b. Where Interchangeability Exists
Although the temporary aid approach rarely can be substi-
tuted for technical coverage where the latter may be proper,
technical coverage often can be substituted for temporary aid in
situations in which temporary aid might be available. In a case in
142 The court must then invalidate that part of the regulation that makes coverage
optional. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 602-03 (1972).
143 420 U.S. at 584-85.
144 Text accompanying notes 147-51 infra.
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which it is unclear whether a class is technically eligible for assis-
tance, but in which aid to the class would further the purposes of
the Act and would comport with HEW's remaining criteria for
temporary aid to the ineligible 145 should HEW find the class
technically ineligible, HEW may offer aid on either a mandatory
or an optional basis. In such circumstances, where the technical
eligibility and temporary aid approaches are interchangeable, re-
sort to the temporary aid approach would supplant technical
eligibility and the corresponding trilogy presumption to the dis-
paragement of the remedial nature of the Social Security Act.
Technical eligibility of unborn children, for instance, may
readily have been found to exist had HEW cast the weight of its
administrative judgment in favor of that interpretation.146 Be-
cause aid to unborn children, given an administrative finding of
their technical ineligibility, also fulfilled the criteria of temporary
aid to the technically ineligible, HEW was able to offer aid to the
unborn on an optional basis, despite the opportunity to include
the unborn as eligible under section 406. As in the the case
where the two approaches are not interchangeable, however, a
court should not defer to HEW's finding of technical ineligibility
but rather should make its own determination of the technical
eligibility of the class in question.
c. The Necessity of an Independent Judicial Determination
of Technical Eligibility
Where eligibility provisions are ambiguous and the legisla-
tive history unclear, yet where inclusion of a class of needy chil-
dren is consistent with the purposes of the Act, the full protec-
tion of the Act should be afforded to that class by a recognition
of technical eligibility.147 Although in Alcala the legislative his-
tory of section 406 and the statutory scheme arguably supported
a finding of technical ineligibility under the Act, in cases of
genuine ambiguity where HEW has adopted the temporary aid
approach, a reviewing court should substitute its judgment for
that of HEW's to find technical eligibility. 48 This refusal to
I" Text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
146 See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra; cf. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S.
598 (1972).
.47 See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 604 (1975) (assumption incorrect that
Congress intended arbitrarily to leave one class of needy children without meaningful
protection); cf. Haberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1969).
"' This is possible because HEW regulations are "interpretative." See text accom-
panying notes 23-32 supra.
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defer to HEW's finding of technical ineligibility is important be-
cause of the potential for abuse of the temporary aid
approach. 149 A judicial finding of technical eligibility would rely
in part, however, on the agency's interpretation of the Act. The
use of the temporary aid approach-whether that approach is
interchangeable with technical eligibility or not150-presupposes
an administrative determination that federal assistance to the
disputed class is consistent with the purposes of, and necessary
to the efficient administration of, the Act.' 5' A court would be
justified in deferring to such a determination because it is free
from the motive for abuse-evasion of the requirement of man-
datory coverage-which exists in HEW's initial determination of
technical ineligibility. An independent judicial determination of
technical eligibility is essential when HEW relies on the tempor-
ary aid approach in situations in which the approach is inappo-
site, because mere invalidation of the regulation would leave the
previously benefited class without assistance.
2. Legitimacy of the Optional Nature of Temporary
Aid to the Technically Ineligible
Even when the Act concededly does not provide for the
technical eligibility of the benefited class, and the temporary aid
approach is invoked properly, the optional character of assis-
tance to technically ineligible recipients may be impermissible.
Although the section 402(a)(10) requirement of prompt assis-
tance to all eligible individuals, and the trilogy rule, may not
apply directly to temporary aid on behalf of technically ineligible
persons, the temporary aid approach is not completely separable
from the technical eligibility provisions and the policies as-
sociated with them. A temporary aid regulation is a legitimate
exercise of HEW's general rulemaking power solely because it
authorizes federal assistance directly related to the needs of a
recipient arising when that recipient is technically eligible.' 52 A
technically eligible individual clearly is afforded the trilogy pre-
sumption of mandatory coverage.' 53 To claim that temporary
149 Text accompanying notes 105-27 supra.
151) Text accompanying notes 128-47 supra.
151 The Court in other contexts has accepted that part of HEW's interpretation
which it approved and rejected those aspects with which it could not agree. See Carleson
v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 602-03 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286
(1971).
152 See text accompanying notes 56-67 supra.
153 Even when Congress itself has authorized optional coverage of a particular
group, a state that chooses to participate in the program for that group must fully
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aid may be extended on an optional basis is to divorce the tem-
porary aid approach from technical eligibility despite the fact
that the former derives its legitimacy from the latter.
Additionally, once HEW concludes that aid to the techni-
cally ineligible in a particular case is consistent with and assists in
achieving the purposes of the AFDC program, payment of fed-
eral funds on behalf of only those technically ineligible persons
whose states choose to assist them is arbitrary. Whether a needy
person qualifying for benefits under a temporary aid regulation
actually receives assistance depends upon the unexplained choice
of a particular state and not upon the presence or absence of
factors on which HEW based its decision that such assistance is
appropriate.
Thus, substantial reasons exist for questioning the legiti-
macy of the optional feature of the temporary aid approach even
in cases in which technical eligibility is unavailable. Of course,
were coverage under temporary aid regulations made manda-
tory, a major practical difference between technical eligibility
and the temporary aid approach would be eliminated, and the
policy of the King-Townsend-Remillard trilogy could no longer be
circumvented by HEW's resort to the temporary aid approach
where technical eligibility is a plausible alternative.
154
IV. CONCLUSION
While HEW has the power under section 1102 of the Act to
authorize payments on behalf of persons not technically eligible
for AFDC benefits, that power is limited intrinsically to narrowly
defined curcumstances and is restricted further by the policies
embodied in the King-Townsend-Remillard trilogy. Under section
1102, HEW may provide temporary aid only to persons who
temporarily do not meet the technical eligibility criteria of the
Act when assistance is substantially related to those persons'
needs arising at the time of technical eligibility.
comply with the applicable federal standards. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 288
(1971). Temporary aid might be made available by HEW to persons in the process of
satisfying the technical eligibility criteria of the optional program. If a state elected not
to participate at all in the optional program, it need not provide benefits authorized by
the temporary aid regulation. But if a state chose to participate in the program, it
should be required to adhere completely to the appropriate federal standards, includ-
ing the administrative judgment that temporary aid for technically ineligibile individuals
is necessary to the efficient administration of the Act.
154 An important reason for preferring technical eligibility over the temporary aid
approach may still exist, however, in that the latter might be subject to greater adminis-
trative revision.
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In cases in which the criteria for temporary aid are not met,
but where an HEW regulation authorizes AFDC benefits on an
optional basis, the regulation should be interpreted as an ad-
ministrative recognition of technical eligibility, and the optional
feature should be evaluated under the trilogy rule. If on the
other hand HEW insists, and a court agrees, that such a regula-
tion both embodies an implicit denial by HEW of technical eligi-
bility and attempts to offer benefits under the temporary aid
approach, the regulation must be invalidated as an unlawful ex-
ercise of HEW's rulemaking power. The reviewing court should
then examine independently the class' technical eligibility.
In those cases in which the temporary aid approach and the
technical eligibility approach are interchangeable, HEW's resort
to the temporary aid approach to extend federal assistance on an
optional basis circumvents the trilogy presumption of mandatory
coverage to the detriment of the remedial nature of the Act.
When eligibility provisions are ambiguous, and HEW has
adopted the temporary aid approach, a reviewing court could
accept HEW's determination that assistance of the class in ques-
tion would further the purposes of the Act, but favor technical
eligibility over the temporary aid approach. A more general
reconciliation of the temporary aid approach with the policies
connected with technical eligibility, applicable even when tech-
nical eligibility is unavailable, may be accomplished by the invali-
dation of the optional feature of the temporary aid approach.
In any event, the remedial purposes of the Social Security Act
should remain the guiding principle in the evaluation of HEW's
novel approach to AFDC eligibility, and that which is potentially
a boon to the achievement of those purposes should not be per-
mitted to erode the substantial advances made to date.
